Arabs between the wars of Iran and Israel: hostility and the pursuit of peace

Iran remains under military attack by the United States and Israel, while its principal response continues to be directed against Gulf Arab states. Iranian aggression is no longer confined to U.S. military bases in the region; it has extended to energy facilities, critical infrastructure, airports, residential buildings, and hotels.

Iranian officials have justified these attacks by claiming that the Americans are evacuating their bases and using civilians as human shields. Such claims do not, under international law, justify the targeting of civilians. In this sense, Iran reproduces the same logic Israel used in Gaza, where the destruction of the Strip was justified by the alleged presence of Hamas fighters in civilian areas and beneath hospitals, and mirrors Israeli operations in Lebanon, where attacks on civilian areas have displaced around one million people. The result, from an Arab perspective, is that neither Iran nor Israel appears to approach Arab civilians through any meaningful ethical standard or within the compass of international law.

Arabs Between Two Threats

For Iran, there has been little sign of recognition for the efforts Gulf states made to prevent the current war. Nor has the Iranian regime appeared to account for the fact that, in restoring relations with Tehran through Chinese mediation, Gulf states effectively chose to move beyond an earlier period in which Iran fueled Sunni-Shiite divisions in Arab countries and sought to expand its influence by fragmenting societies and redirecting loyalties beyond the framework of the nation-state. Gulf states chose to set aside that legacy in pursuit of relations based on respect and shared interests and in support of building modern states capable of serving the region’s peoples.

Iran, however, chose to remain attached to regressive ideas centered on domination, securitized politics, and the imposition of interests by force. At a moment when the world is moving toward artificial intelligence and even space tourism, Iran has instead chosen to hold the region hostage through missiles and drones, producing a new language of threats. After a phase in which it had moved into the category of a neighboring state with workable relations, it is now described by UAE President Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed as an “enemy,” while official discourse increasingly refers to its conduct as “terrorist Attacks.” Any serious conception of regional stability now requires addressing Iran’s nuclear program, missile capabilities, and drone arsenal in order to prevent the region and its populations from being terrorized again. The central point is clear: The UAE will not accept the repetition of such threat in the future.

This raises another question: is Iran prepared to commit even greater crimes and acts of terrorism creating  longterm enemies across the Arab world, as it has effectively done in Syria? Broadening the circle of Arab hostility toward Iran is not in Tehran’s interest, whether under the current regime or under any future leadership that may emerge from the present crisis. Nor is it in the interest of Gulf states, which seek to focus on prosperity and on keeping pace with global modernity beyond sectarianism and religiously framed enmity. Yet Iran still does not appear committed to such a path. This was precisely the meaning conveyed in the statement issued after the Arab-Islamic ministerial meeting in Riyadh, even as Iran continued military operations against Saudi Arabia during the gathering.

As for Israel, together with the United States it appears to have moved from the strategy of managing the Iranian threat to the strategy of terminating it, without consultation with the states expected to bear the military consequences and not only the economic costs. That shift represented a shock to many in the region who had assumed that Israel operated within a framework of interest and political rationality. Instead, Israel now appears to be pursuing policies that are either erratic and poorly calculated, or worse, calculated as it is  unfolding: the weakening of the Iranian state, the wearing down of Gulf models, the rise of Israeli military power and regional dominance. It may even open the way to question further persuits of targeting other states in the region, such as Turkey, on the basis of their relations with Hamas, Iran, or any other perceived threat within an increasingly expansive Israeli identification of a threat.

Aspirations for the partnership with Israel

After the Abraham Accords, Arab relations with Israel were open to a wide range of possibilities that could have represented a strategic opportunity for those who aspired a stable and prosperous Middle East capable of reaching a settlement to the Palestinian cause that achieves equal rights, justice, and peace. Yet the accords were not matched by sufficient Israeli flexibility to build on that development, whether by taking meaningful steps toward a two-state solution or by signaling genuine willingness to enter such negotiations. Had that occurred, the region might have opened onto scenarios very different from the one it faces today, namely the return of hostility toward both Israel and Iran.

The stagnation that marked Israel’s relationship with the Palestinians was matched by a parallel stagnation in its relationship with the Arab world. The October events that followed further complicated matters and brought back to the forefront of Arab political memory the extent to which Israel can disregard concerns that Arab states and leaders consider as fundamental, above all the principle that Arab civilian lives should be protected under international law. This includes the targeting of civilians in Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria. In that respect, Israel’s conduct converges with Iran’s own treatment of civilians in Arab states during wartime, where no meaningful red lines appear to exist. This represents another severe blow to international law and to principles that international institutions have sought to preserve since the Second World War. The question, then, is whether the Middle East now stands outside the limitations of international law.

Gulf states have never, in their history, taken hostile action against either Israel or Iran. Yet both countries have, in different ways, posed direct threats to Gulf security and stability. Qatar illustrates this pattern clearly. It was targeted twice by Israel: first during the twelve-day war, in a development that sent shockwaves through the region and reverberated into the Trump administration; and second through Israeli strikes on energy facilities linked to the shared field between Iran and Qatar. Iran, in turn, retaliated by striking Qatari facilities.

This raises a further question: is Qatar now being targeted by both Israel and Iran? And in the course of its effort to eliminate the Iranian regime, will Israel end up overriding Gulf interests and security, whether directly in Qatar’s case or indirectly by accepting Iran’s continued attacks on Gulf states regardless of the cost and regardless of how far Iranian aggression may escalate?

Eliminating the Threat Versus the Cost

Dr. Anwar Gargash has indicated that once the war ends, there will need to be an agreement ensuring that Iran cannot use its nuclear program, missile capabilities, or drones to terrorize the region. This is a central element in the UAE’s view of the war’s required outcome, especially given that the UAE has been among the states most directly targeted by Iran. That in itself reflects how strongly the Iranian regime appears to perceive the modern Emirati model as a challenge, particularly when contrasted with an Iranian model that continues to offer its people little beyond the rhetoric of hostility toward the “greater” and “lesser” Satan.

Reaching a scenario in which Iran can no longer threaten its neighbors would require pushing Tehran to review its offensive military capabilities and to accept a more defensive framework which is the right to every nation. In principle, this should become a matter of internal debate within the Iranian system if the goal is to preserve the state itself. Such a review could emerge either from an Iranian recognition that continued military operations may produce rapid collapse or a prolonged exhaustion dynamic resembling Iraq’s collaps scenario. At present, however, no such debate appears visible. Nor does there seem to be a clear Iranian understanding of Israel’s willingness and capacity to continue this war at any high cost, especially under U.S. backing. For his part, President Trump is unlikely to declare an end to the war without a victory, and that outcome ultimately depends on choices made within the Iranian regime itself, which now needs to produce both a narrative of victory and a formula for concession. Even under such a scenario, the Iranian threat would not disappear entirely. The logic of hostility would remain, but with offensive capabilities curtailed while any breach should be subject to close international monitoring.

A second path would involve an intellectual reversal from within the Iranian establishment itself, bringing forward leadership with a different vision, perhaps not fully peaceful, but at least less threatening. That has not happened thus far. If the regime is to reproduce itself, that process would need to involve gradual changes in its structure and in the way it understands its place in the region and its future as a nation-state rather than a transnational project. Such a shift could open the way for genuinely good-neighborly relations, eventually ending the concept of Iranian hostility toward Arabs and replacing sectarian expansion with a new political and economic vision. But this would require weighty decisions from Iranian leaders, serious and substantive decisions rather than cosmetic adjustments.

A third scenario, and one Israel often appears to regard as the safest option, is to continue until the Iranian regime collapses, whether through ongoing military operations or through prolonged economic and political isolation. President Trump, however, is a leader who seeks rapid results and does not appear naturally inclined toward strategies that extend beyond his own presidential term, even if he may eventually be drawn into them. This means that operations against Iran could escalate into a more dangerous phase aimed at accelerating the outcome by targeting the oil sector, related facilities, and essential infrastructure such as electricity and water, thereby producing comprehensive economic and social paralysis inside Iran. Such a scenario would almost certainly be accompanied by retaliatory Iranian aggression against Gulf states, which have been using mediation precisely to avoid the “at any cost” strategy that Israel is currently pursuing with U.S. support.

Between War and Managing the Threat

The UAE, as a strategic economic and social model in the Arab world, has succeeded in confronting Iranian aggression while also resisting the recklessness of Israeli wars and their effort to draw Gulf states into carrying the consequences. It has also managed, throughout this crisis, to navigate the boundaries between hostility and cooperation, and between confrontation and engagement.

Regardless of the eventual Israeli-American-Iranian scenario, states view the world through the lens of interests, and the calculation of those interests depends on the political understanding and accumulated experience of leaders who are compelled, under certain conditions, to deal with one another. The inability to understand the contradictions of one another and the strategy drivers in different states has repeatedly led to war.

The refusal of Gulf states to go into direct military confrontation with Iran, or to allow their territories to be used against it, rests on several considerations. First, Gulf states do not want a long-term enmity with the Iranian people by being part of a militery operation against their land. Second, the gulf states do not want their populations, infrastructure, and everything they have built over decades to bear the cost of participating in attacks against a neighboring Muslim state in a war that is not being conducted within the bounds of international law or the principles of civilian protection. Third, Gulf states have long believed that managing the Iranian threat may offer a more sustainable long-term path, allowing gradual change within the Iranian system without direct external intervention. Whatever militias, terrorist cells, and civil wars the Iranian regime has produced across the Middle East, the choice of how to deal with that challenge at the regional level should remain with the states of the regiona themselves.

It may be that the survival of the Iranian regime in its current form amounts to managing the threat. It may also be that the final day of the Islamic Republic would represent the end of the threat in its present form. The equation is ultimately a wager on the levels of this threat, some of its components may not yet be fully visible. In all cases, the states most directly affected must determine for themselves which scenario they believe is most viable for the future stability of the region. Gulf states are directly affected by the choices made by Israel and the United States, and on that basis they should be part of both the decision-making and the debate, especially as they continue to be asked, in one way or another, to participate in operations against Iran, which they still refuse to do.

Gulf states may eventually move beyond a purely defensive approach if Iranian aggression against vital infrastructure and civilian sites inside their cities becomes more dangerous. For now, the balance still favors defensive calculations. But if the costs of participating in the war come to equal the costs of staying out of it, Iran should understand the strategic shift that would follow if its pressure on the international community and the global economy, exercised through attacks on Gulf states, ends up drawing those states into the war.

Direct Gulf participation  in the war would necessarily mean heavier Iranian losses and a faster military and economic collapse of the regime. At the same time, such participation would also mean a collapse of confidence in any shared interests with Israel, even if the adversary is the same. Isreal should understand that the calculus of losses and acceptance of them are not identical for all parties affected by this war. Respect for neighboring countries through consultation, planning, and the construction of long-term economic interests are all principles that have suffered a major blow. And has clearly affected Gulf strategic calculations and Gulf planing to protect their national security. For that reason, the Gulf approach to both Israel and Iran will not remain the same regardless of how the war ends.